Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1483.91061
author: Yaron Azrieli
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 7481343
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: monitoring
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.12.008
OpenAlex ID: W4206446842
cites work: Monitoring experts
cites work: Mechanism design with information acquisition
cites work: Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
cites work: Q5829371
cites work: Robust incentives for information acquisition
cites work: Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
cites work: Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
cites work: Information acquisition in committees
cites work: Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
cites work: Q3624182
cites work: Q4669353
cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
cites work: Q5599348
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.12.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481343