Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1483.91136
author: Yusuke Iwase
author: Shoya Tsuruta
author: Akina Yoshimura
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7481352
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: constrained efficient stability
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.01.012
OpenAlex ID: W4210790765
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.012
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481352