Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1485.91122
author: Swagata Bhattacharjee
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: paper15.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 7481362
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic contract
zbMATH Keywords: patent law
zbMATH Keywords: innovation
zbMATH Keywords: R\&D
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W4210316161
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.015
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481362