Robust coalitional implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust coalitional implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1485.91086
author: Huiyi Guo
author: Nicholas C. Yannelis
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-02-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7481363
zbMATH Keywords: belief-free implementation
zbMATH Keywords: full implementation
zbMATH Keywords: coalition
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.01.022
OpenAlex ID: W4210360558
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.022
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7481363