A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A bargaining model for sharing water in a river with negative externality
author: Shivshanker Singh Patel
author: Parthasarathy Ramachandran
published in: Opsearch
publication date: 2022-10-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90Bxx
zbMATH DE Number: 7603415
zbMATH Keywords: river sharing problem
zbMATH Keywords: negative externality
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s12597-021-00555-z
OpenAlex ID: W3194145421
cites work: Sharing a river.
cites work: Trading water along a river
cites work: Sharing a river among satiable agents
cites work: Sharing a polluted river
cites work: The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
cites work: Sharing the costs of cleanup polluted river: upstream compensation method
cites work: Q3999542
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
DOI: 10.1007/S12597-021-00555-Z
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7603415