Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
zbMATH Open document ID: 1497.91117
author: Lars Ehlers
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2022-10-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 7596940
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: multiple public goods
zbMATH Keywords: lexicographic
zbMATH Keywords: replacement-domination
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-022-00306-6
OpenAlex ID: W3215778168
Wikidata QID: Q114228607
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-022-00306-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7596940