A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A tractable multi-leader multi-follower peak-load-pricing model with strategic interaction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1501.91035
author: Veronika Grimm
author: Daniel Nowak
author: Lars Schewe
author: Martin Schmidt
author: Alexandra Schwartz
author: Gregor Zöttl
published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B
publication date: 2022-10-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B74
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C26
zbMATH DE Number: 7606026
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: Nash-Cournot equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: multi-leader multi-follower game
zbMATH Keywords: peak-load pricing
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10107-021-01708-0
OpenAlex ID: W4226360227
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DOI: 10.1007/S10107-021-01708-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7606026