Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index
zbMATH Open document ID: 1501.91014
author: Yuto Ushioda
author: Masato Tanaka
author: Tomomi Matsui
published in: Games
publication date: 2022-11-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7610680
zbMATH Keywords: voting game
zbMATH Keywords: weighted majority game
zbMATH Keywords: power index
zbMATH Keywords: Monte Carlo algorithm
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g13030044
OpenAlex ID: W4282002316
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DOI: 10.3390/G13030044
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7610680