Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1501.91008
author: Malin Arve
author: Marco Serena
published in: Games
publication date: 2022-11-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7610681
zbMATH Keywords: Tullock contests
zbMATH Keywords: level-\(k\) reasoning
zbMATH Keywords: overspending
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g13030045
OpenAlex ID: W4281953646
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DOI: 10.3390/G13030045
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7610681