Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1501.91062
author: Shashwat Khare
author: Ton Storcken
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2022-10-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 06A06
zbMATH DE Number: 7608523
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-022-01399-2
OpenAlex ID: W4226471951
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-022-01399-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7608523