Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1504.91053
author: Mehmet Ekmekci
author: Lucas Maestri
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-11-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A55
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 7614325
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: reputation dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect monitoring
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2022.105541
OpenAlex ID: W4294190653
Wikidata QID: Q114160449
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2022.105541
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7614325