Incomplete contracts versus communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incomplete contracts versus communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 1504.91142
author: Andreas Blume
author: Inga Deimen
author: Sean Inoue
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-11-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7614327
zbMATH Keywords: strategic communication
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
Wikidata QID: Q114160446
full work available at URL: j.jet.2022.105544
OpenAlex ID: W4293833768
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2022.105544
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7614327