Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1504.91023
author: Sam Jindani
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2022-11-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 7614332
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2022.105551
OpenAlex ID: W4296378831
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2022.105551
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7614332