Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91033
author: Margarita Domènech
author: José Miguel Giménez
author: María Jesús de la Puente
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2022-11-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7617104
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: bicooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: Banzhaf bisemivalue
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley bisemivalue
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10479-021-04153-6
OpenAlex ID: W3172548412
cites work: Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
cites work: Q2715704
cites work: The Shapley value for bicooperative games
cites work: The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games
cites work: Biprobabilistic values for bicooperative games
cites work: The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games
cites work: Semivalues as power indices.
cites work: Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions
cites work: Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
cites work: A new index of power for simple n-person games
cites work: Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
cites work: Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
cites work: Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
cites work: On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
cites work: Value Theory Without Efficiency
cites work: Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values
cites work: Ternary voting games
cites work: Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output
cites work: Reliability importance measures of the components in a system based on semivalues and probabilistic values
cites work: Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
cites work: Bi-capacities. I: Definition, Möbius transform and interaction
cites work: Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
cites work: An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
cites work: Multilinear Extensions of Games
cites work: Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
cites work: Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
DOI: 10.1007/S10479-021-04153-6
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7617104