Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust multidimensional pricing: separation without regret
zbMATH Open document ID: 1504.91108
author: Çağıl Koçyiğit
author: Napat Rujeerapaiboon
author: Daniel Kuhn
published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B
publication date: 2022-11-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C47
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C17
zbMATH DE Number: 7616325
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10107-021-01615-4
OpenAlex ID: W3122059861
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DOI: 10.1007/S10107-021-01615-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7616325