Theoretical design of decentralized auction framework under mobile crowdsourcing environment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Theoretical design of decentralized auction framework under mobile crowdsourcing environment
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91182
author: Jianxiong Guo
author: Xingjian Ding
author: Tian Wang
author: Weijia Jia
published in: Theoretical Computer Science
publication date: 2022-11-17T00:00:00Z
review text: In this article, the authors proposed a decentralized auction framework where mobile workers are sellers and task requesters are buyers. In Section 5, the authors conduct the theoretical analysis. It is proven that the framework is individual (Lemma 1), budget balanced (Lemma 2), truthful (Lema 3), and computationally efficient (Lemma 4). Numerical simulations are given in Section 6.
reviewed by: Nikolay Kyurkchiev
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7619408
zbMATH Keywords: decentralization
zbMATH Keywords: incentive mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: auction theory
zbMATH Keywords: utility maximization
zbMATH Keywords: truthfulness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tcs.2022.10.030
OpenAlex ID: W4307814776
cites work: Algorithmic Game Theory
cites work: Optimal Coverage in Wireless Sensor Networks
DOI: 10.1016/J.TCS.2022.10.030
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7619408