Simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Simple unawareness in dynamic psychological games
author: Carsten S. Nielsen
author: Alexander Sebald
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 7622020
zbMATH Keywords: unawareness
zbMATH Keywords: psychological payoffs
zbMATH Keywords: extensive-form rationalizability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2015-0011
OpenAlex ID: W2185679777
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DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2015-0011
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622020