Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
author: Benjamín Tello
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7622039
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
zbMATH Keywords: dropping strategies
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2016-0131
OpenAlex ID: W2604187725
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DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0131
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622039