Symmetric equilibria in a cost-averting war of attrition requiring minimum necessary conceders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetric equilibria in a cost-averting war of attrition requiring minimum necessary conceders
author: Geofferey Jiyun Kim
author: Bara Kim
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 7622049
zbMATH Keywords: Bellman equation
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: public economics
zbMATH Keywords: trembling hand perfection
zbMATH Keywords: war of attrition
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2016-0109
OpenAlex ID: W2758182274
cites work: Joint Projects without Commitment
cites work: A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
cites work: Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0109
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622049