Structural control in weighted voting games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Structural control in weighted voting games
author: Anja Rey
author: Jörg Rothe
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
zbMATH DE Number: 7622070
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic game theory
zbMATH Keywords: weighted voting games
zbMATH Keywords: structural control
zbMATH Keywords: power indices
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2016-0169
OpenAlex ID: W2883677140
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Wikidata QID: Q129496224
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0169
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622070