Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems
author: Elias Tsakas
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 7622072
zbMATH Keywords: agreement
zbMATH Keywords: posterior beliefs
zbMATH Keywords: conditional probability systems
zbMATH Keywords: conditioning events
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2016-0182
OpenAlex ID: W2802882483
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Wikidata QID: Q129883888
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0182
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622072