Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
author: Addison Pan
author: Simona Fabrizi
author: Steffen Lippert
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-05
zbMATH DE Number: 7622074
zbMATH Keywords: group decision-making
zbMATH Keywords: voting rules
zbMATH Keywords: non-congruent views
zbMATH Keywords: jury trial
zbMATH Keywords: referenda
zbMATH Keywords: simulations
zbMATH Keywords: human-subjects laboratory experiment
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2016-0185
OpenAlex ID: W2804460388
Wikidata QID: Q114053189
cites work: When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
cites work: Q5505176
cites work: A minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory
cites work: Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty
cites work: Deliberative voting
cites work: An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
cites work: Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior
cites work: An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2016-0185
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622074