Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
author: Hitoshi Matsushima
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A27
zbMATH DE Number: 7622093
zbMATH Keywords: efficient combinatorial allocations
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: opt-out types
zbMATH Keywords: interim individual rationality
zbMATH Keywords: marginal stability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2017-0072
OpenAlex ID: W2183656449
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DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2017-0072
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622093