A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders
author: Nicola Doni
author: Domenico Menicucci
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7622106
zbMATH Keywords: first price auction
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric bidders
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2018-0105
OpenAlex ID: W2902974357
cites work: Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
cites work: Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
cites work: Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
cites work: A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
cites work: Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
cites work: Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
cites work: Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
Wikidata QID: Q128815622
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0105
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622106