Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Behavioral theory of repeated prisoner's dilemma: generous tit-for-tat strategy
author: Hitoshi Matsushima
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 7622133
zbMATH Keywords: repeated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect private monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: generous tit-for-tat strategy
zbMATH Keywords: reciprocity
zbMATH Keywords: naïveté
zbMATH Keywords: behavioral equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2019-0030
OpenAlex ID: W2935910307
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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Wikidata QID: Q126805973
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0030
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622133