Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games
author: Wooyoung Lim
author: Jipeng Zhang
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 7622146
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous authority
zbMATH Keywords: punishment
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: group size
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2019-0057
OpenAlex ID: W3011884269
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DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0057
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622146