Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
publication date: 2022-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 7622152
zbMATH Keywords: speculation
zbMATH Keywords: betting
zbMATH Keywords: agreement
zbMATH Keywords: common knowledge
author: John D. Geanakoplos
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: bejte-2019-0010
OpenAlex ID: W3174342411
cites work: Agreeing to disagree
cites work: Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
cites work: Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
cites work: Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
cites work: Learning to agree
cites work: The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
cites work: We can't disagree forever
cites work: A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
cites work: Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
cites work: Information, trade and common knowledge
cites work: Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
cites work: Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
cites work: Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
cites work: On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0010
published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622152