Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91316
author: Hans Gersbach
author: Akaki Mamageishvili
author: Oriol Tejada
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2022-11-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7622953
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: committee
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: monetary transfers
zbMATH Keywords: majority rule
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete social contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2022.04.005
OpenAlex ID: W4293074764
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2022.04.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622953