Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91260
author: Ethem Akyol
published in: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication date: 2022-12-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7629369
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: Boston mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: ex-ante welfare
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s13235-022-00446-y
OpenAlex ID: W4224302850
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DOI: 10.1007/S13235-022-00446-Y
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7629369