Bipartite choices
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bipartite choices
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91267
published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance
publication date: 2022-12-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7629800
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: stable marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: college admission problem
zbMATH Keywords: bipartite graph
author: Marco LiCalzi
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10203-022-00380-z
OpenAlex ID: W4309637780
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DOI: 10.1007/S10203-022-00380-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7629800