Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91087
author: Mathias Staudigl
author: Srinivas Arigapudi
author: William H. Sandholm
published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games
publication date: 2022-12-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60J10
zbMATH DE Number: 7629994
zbMATH Keywords: Markov chains
zbMATH Keywords: large deviations
zbMATH Keywords: Hamilton-Jacobi equations
zbMATH Keywords: state-constrained optimal control
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jdg.2021021
OpenAlex ID: W3177763850
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DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2021021
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7629994