Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Psychological Nash equilibria under ambiguity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1505.91024
author: Giuseppe De Marco
author: Maria Romaniello
author: Alba Roviello
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2022-12-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A11
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A30
zbMATH DE Number: 7634639
zbMATH Keywords: psychological games
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguous beliefs
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium existence
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2022.09.005
OpenAlex ID: W3194172745
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.09.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7634639