Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1484.91170
author: Mostapha Diss
author: Michele Gori
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2022-03-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: WP-2020-06.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7489919
zbMATH Keywords: social preference correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: positional rule
zbMATH Keywords: qualified majority
zbMATH Keywords: probability
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet consistency
describes a project that uses: Normaliz
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3172016969
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-021-09828-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7489919