The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_14
author: Ildikó Schlotter
author: Péter Biró
author: Tamás Fleiner
publication date: 2022-07-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.06875
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68M11
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7553927
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W4206055328
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description: scientific article