Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
zbMATH Open document ID: 1163.91503
author: Mourad Baïou
author: Michel Balinski
published in: Operations Research Letters
publication date: 2008-01-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5228909
zbMATH Keywords: stable marriage
zbMATH Keywords: stable assignment
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal transportation
zbMATH Keywords: university admissions
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided market
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-many matching
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.orl.2006.06.004
OpenAlex ID: W2015156887
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ORL.2006.06.004
description: scientific article