Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
zbMATH Open document ID: 1117.91021
author: John Duggan
author: Mark Fey
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2005-08-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/2121
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 2192268
zbMATH Keywords: Office-motivation
zbMATH Keywords: Policy-motivation
zbMATH Keywords: Spatial model of voting
zbMATH Keywords: Probabilistic voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2103413037
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2004.11.006
description: scientific article