Would rational voters acquire costly information?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1132.91400
author: César Martinelli
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2006-07-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 5042271
zbMATH Keywords: rational ignorance
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2005.02.005
OpenAlex ID: W1994684763
Wikidata QID: Q56226517
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cites work: Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.02.005
description: scientific article