Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1378.91021
author: Koji Takamiya
author: Akira Tanaka
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2016-03-10T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/63933
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q25
zbMATH DE Number: 6553072
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
zbMATH Keywords: NP-completeness
zbMATH Keywords: simple game
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: Nakamura number
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2150100569
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-014-9422-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6553072