Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1348.91098
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_17
author: Jean-François Laslier
author: François Maniquet
published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2016-11-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6649197
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 978-3-642-02839-7 17
OpenAlex ID: W1628982882
cites work: Q3323629
cites work: Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections
cites work: Approval voting with endogenous candidates
cites work: Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
cites work: Approval Voting in Large Electorates
cites work: Deterministic observation: theory and applications
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description: scientific article