Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
zbMATH Open document ID: 1274.91222
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA8772
published in: Econometrica
publication date: 2013-11-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6224049
zbMATH Keywords: implementation with renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
zbMATH Keywords: hold-up problem
zbMATH Keywords: communication costs
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: ecta8772
OpenAlex ID: W1602672052
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title: Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
author: Robert Evans
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6224049