Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
zbMATH Open document ID: 1250.91070
DOI: 10.1017/S1365100510000076
author: Kevin X. D. Huang
author: Guoqiang Tian
published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics
publication date: 2012-10-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6098407
zbMATH Keywords: monetary policy
zbMATH Keywords: time consistency
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contract
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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title: Reputation and optimal contracts for central bankers
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6098407