Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1341.92049
author: Shun Kurokawa
published in: Mathematical Biosciences
publication date: 2016-06-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6596604
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: reciprocity
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect information
zbMATH Keywords: mistakes
zbMATH Keywords: payoff linearity
zbMATH Keywords: synergetic effect
Wikidata QID: Q47442254
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mbs.2016.03.011
OpenAlex ID: W2314341646
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MBS.2016.03.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6596604