Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Modeling costly learning and counter-learning in a defender-attacker game with private defender information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1345.91064
author: Jie Xu
author: Jun Zhuang
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2016-09-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6628226
zbMATH Keywords: defender-attacker games
zbMATH Keywords: costly learning
zbMATH Keywords: counter-learning
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: value of perfect information
zbMATH Keywords: value of imperfect information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10479-014-1722-3
OpenAlex ID: W2168868668
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DOI: 10.1007/S10479-014-1722-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6628226