Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1394.91152
author: Brian Baisa
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2016-10-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6636947
zbMATH Keywords: multi-unit auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auctions
zbMATH Keywords: uniform-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: wealth effects
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2016.07.002
OpenAlex ID: W2499100997
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6636947