Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1367.91117
author: Maria Gabriella Graziano
author: Maria Romaniello
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2016-10-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 6637065
zbMATH Keywords: public projects
zbMATH Keywords: contribution measures
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
zbMATH Keywords: sophisticated stable sets
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-014-0854-7
OpenAlex ID: W2049318735
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-014-0854-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6637065