Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91042
author: Grisel Ayllón
author: Diego M. Caramuta
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2016-10-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 6644510
zbMATH Keywords: single-dipped preference
zbMATH Keywords: public bads
zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: unanimity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-016-0957-0
OpenAlex ID: W2319209857
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0957-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6644510