A decomposition of strategy-proofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A decomposition of strategy-proofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91064
author: Nozomu Muto
author: Shin Sato
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2016-10-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6644512
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness decomposition
zbMATH Keywords: top-restricted AM-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: weak monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: individual bounded response
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-016-0959-y
OpenAlex ID: W2317897940
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0959-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6644512