Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0536.90004
DOI: 10.1137/0605028
published in: SIAM Journal on Algebraic Discrete Methods
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68R99
zbMATH DE Number: 3852733
zbMATH Keywords: representative systems
zbMATH Keywords: cyclic majorities
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: group choice
zbMATH Keywords: discrete ranking structures
zbMATH Keywords: nested hierarchies of sign functions
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial impossibility theorems
zbMATH Keywords: integer optimization
zbMATH Keywords: linear separation lemmas
author: Peter Fishburn
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0605028
OpenAlex ID: W2071989092
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description: scientific article