Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
zbMATH Open document ID: 1348.91109
DOI: 10.1134/S0005117916030012
author: Yuliya Veselova
published in: Automation and Remote Control
publication date: 2016-11-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-02
zbMATH DE Number: 6645986
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0005117916030012
OpenAlex ID: W2326459646
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6645986