Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1371.91121
author: Guy Arie
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2016-11-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C05
zbMATH DE Number: 6647326
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: nonlinear incentives
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: duality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2016.08.002
OpenAlex ID: W3125348391
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2016.08.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6647326